"An event occurred on the 7th which must not be omitted from the narrative. Perceiving the difficulties that surrounded the army, and believing its extrication hopeless, a number of the principal officers, from a feeling of affection and sympathy for the commander-in-chief, and with a wish to lighten his responsibility and soften the pain of defeat, volunteered to inform him that, in their opinion, the struggle had reached a point where further resistance was hopeless, and that the contest should be terminated and negotiations opened for a surrender of the army. The delivery of this opinion was confided to General Pendleton, who, both by his character and devotion to General Lee, was well qualified for such an office. The names of General Longstreet and some others, who did not coincide in the opinion of their associates, did not appear in the list presented by Pendleton."
General Longstreet adds:
"In the forenoon, General Pendleton came to me and reported the proceedings of the self-constituted council of war of the night before, and stated that he had been requested to make the report and ask to have me bear it to General Lee, in the name of the members of the council. Much surprised, I turned and asked if he did not know that the Articles of War provided that officers or soldiers who asked commanding officers to surrender should be shot, and said, “If General Lee doesn’t know when to surrender until I tell him, he will never know.
"General Pendleton then went to General Lee and made the report."
General Long’s report of the meeting between Lee and Pendleton:
"General Lee was lying on the ground. No others heard the conversation between him and myself. He received my communication with the reply, “Oh, no, I trust it has not come to that,’ and added, ‘General, we have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with spirit, while our boys still do. Besides, if I were to say a word to the Federal commander, he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as to make it the condition of demanding an unconditional surrender, a proposal to which I will never listen. . . . I have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination for our subjugation, make good, in the long run, our independence, unless foreign powers should, directly or indirectly, assist us. . . . But such considerations really make with me no difference. We had, I was satisfied, sacred principles to maintain, and rights to defend, for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if we perished in the endeavor."
Source: From Manassas to Appomattox
Commentary
A few days before Lee actually decided to surrender at Appomattox, several of his subordinates, including General William Pendleton, took it upon themselves to hold a council of war in which the commander-in-chief was not present. At this council, they decided the time to surrender had come, and they deemed it necessary to inform General Lee of their decision.
Other commanders, General Longstreet included, found the council objectionable and even illegal. These commanders would not attend or endorse the conclusions. Longstreet, especially, became angry when he discovered what had been discussed behind Lee's back.
A.L. Long, a member of Lee's staff, with some commentary by General Longstreet tells the story: