HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, June 10, 1862.
MAJOR: Agreeably to verbal instructions from the commanding general, the division of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill was on the morning of the 31st ultimo formed at an early hour on the Williamsburg road as the column of attack upon the enemy's front on that road. A brigade was placed on each side of the road to advance to the attack, and each was supported by one of the other brigades of the same division. In advance of each of the columns of attack a regiment as skirmishers were deployed. The plan for the forward movement was that fields should be passed by a flank movement of the regiment of skirmishers, and the woods in front, once in our possession, the brigades were to advance rapidly, occupy them, and move rapidly forward. Abatis and intrenched positions were ordered to be taken by a flank movement of the brigades or brigade in front of them, the skirmishers engaging the sharpshooters and the supporting brigade occupying the position of the brigades during the flank movement. The division of Major-General Huger was intended to make a strong flank movement around the left of the enemy's position and attack him in rear of that flank. This division did not get into position, however, in time for any such attack, and I was obliged to send three of my small brigades on the Charles city road to support the one of Major-General Huger's which had been ordered to protect my right flank.
After waiting some six hours for these troops to get into position I determined to move forward without regard to them, and gave orders to that effect to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill.
The forward movement began about 2 o'clock, and our skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy. The entire division of General Hill became engaged about 3 o'clock, and drove the enemy steadily back, gaining possession of his abatis and part of his intrenched camp; General Rodes, by a movement to the right, driving in the enemy's left.
The only re-enforcements on the field in hand were my own brigades, of which Anderson's, Wilcox's, and Kemper's were put in by the front on the Williamsburg road, and Colston's and Pryor's by my right flank; Colston's just in time to turn the enemy's flank. At the same time the decided and gallant attack made by the other brigades gained entire possession of the enemy's position, with his artillery, camp equipage, &c. Anderson's brigade, under Colonel Jenkins, pressing forward rapidly, continued to drive the enemy until night-fall.
The severest part of the work was done by Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's division, but the attack of the two brigades under General R. H. Anderson-- one commanded by Colonel Kemper (now brigadier general), the other by Col. M. Jenkins-was made with such spirit and regularity as to have driven back the most determined foe. This decided the day in our favor.
General Pickett's brigade was held in reserve. General Pryor's did not succeed in getting upon the field of Saturday in time to take part in the action of the 31st. Both, however, shared in repulsing a serious attack upon our position on Sunday, the 1st instant, Pickett's brigade bearing the brunt of the attack and repulsing it. Some of the brigades of Major-General Huger's division took part in defending our position on Sunday, but, being fresh at the work, did not show the same steadiness and determination as the troops of Hill's division and my own.
I have reason to believe that the affair would have been a complete success had the troops upon the right been put in position within eight hours of the proper time. The want of promptness on that part of the field and the consequent severe struggle in my front so greatly reduced my supply of ammunition, that at the late hour of the move on the left I was unable to make the rush necessary to relieve that attack. Besides the good effect produced by driving back such heavy masses of the enemy, we have made superior soldiers of several brigades that were entirely fresh and unreliable. There can scarcely be a doubt about our ability to overcome the enemy upon any fair field.
The conduct of the attack was left entirely to Major-General Hill. The entire success of the affair is sufficient evidence of his ability, courage, and skill. I refer you to his report for particular mention of the conduct of his officers and soldiers. I will mention Brigadier-General Rodes, of that division, as distinguished for coolness, ability, and determination. He made one of the most important and decisive movements on the field and held his command some hours after receiving a severe wound.
My own troops have been so often tried and distinguished on other fields that they need no praise from my lips. A truer, better body of men never marched upon a battle-field. I will mention, however, as distinguished for their usual gallantry and ability, Generals R. H. Anderson, C. M. Wilcox, George E. Pickett, R. E. Colston, and Roger A. Pryor, and Colonels Kemper and Jenkins (commanding brigades), Corse, Winston, Funsten, and Sydenham Moore, the latter twice shot, once severely wounded.
I desire also to mention the conspicuous courage and energy of Capt. James Dearing, of the Lynchburg Artillery, and his officers and men. His pieces were served under the severest fire, as his serious loss will attest. Captain Carter, of General Hill's division, also displayed great gallantry and skill in the management of his battery. Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, in the absence of any opportunity to use his cavalry, was of material service by his presence with me on the field.
My personal staff--Majrs. G. M. Sorrel, J. W. Fairfax, P. T. Manning, and Capts. Thomas Goree, Thomas Walton, and my young aide Lieutenant Blackwell--have my kind thanks for their activity, zeal, and intelligence in carrying orders and the proper discharge of their duties. Captain Walton was slightly wounded.
I am also indebted to General Wigfall and Col. P. T. Moore, volunteer aides, for assistance in rallying troops and conveying orders during the battle of the 31st ultimo and 1st instant.
Captain Ochiltree, of the Adjutant-General's Department, joined me on the 1st instant, and kindly aided in carrying orders during the several assaults made by the enemy on that day. I am also indebted to Col. R. H. Chilton for material aid.
Dr. J. S. D. Cullen, surgeon in chief, and the officers of his department kindly and untiringly devoted themselves to the wounded. They have none of the chances of distinction of other officers, but discharge the most important duties. I refer to his report for the conduct of the officers of his department. Detailed reports of the major-generals, brigadiers, and other commanders and chiefs of staff have been called for and will be forwarded as soon as received.
Our loss in valuable officers and men has been severe. Colonels Giles (Fifth South Carolina), Jones (Twelfth Alabama), and Lomax Third Alabama) fell at the head of their commands, gallantly leading them to victory. Three hundred and forty-seven prisoners, 10 pieces of artillery, 5,000 small-arms, 1 garrison, and several regimental standards were taken. A rough estimate of the loss on this part of the field may be put at 3,000 killed and wounded. The loss on the part of the enemy may be put at a much higher figure, inasmuch as he was driven from his positions, and some half dozen attempts to recover them were successfully repulsed.
Respectfully submitted.
JAMES LONGSTREET, Major-General, Commanding
Source: Official Records
Commentary
Major-General James Longstreet's report of the battle of Seven Pines.
This report was the source of heated debate concerning who was to blame for the mistakes of that battle. Longstreet, in this report, implies that the fault lay with Benjamin Huger, and General Johnston, then commanding Confederate forces around Richmond, took Longstreet's version as the truth, presenting it in his own report.
Many details of this report are completely incorrect. In truth, Longstreet took the wrong road for his march and ran into the troops under Huger. Due to Johnston's failing to inform Huger that Longstreet would be commanding the entire right wing of the army, this clash of commands resulted in a lengthy delay. Eventually, when the troops were finally straightened out and sent toward the line of battle, Huger's command was sent off, by Longstreet, out of position and took only a small part in the battle.
Seven Pines marks the low point of Longstreet's career as a Confederate general. The only time he failed as badly as he did on this field was when he refused, later in his life, to fully accept the blame for the failures of the battle.