Camp Rappahannock, October 26, 1863
My Dear General,-- I have received your three letters, September 26, October 6, and October 11. The first was received just as I was about to make a move upon General Meade, to prevent his detaching reinforcements to Rosecrans. The second when I had gone as far as I thought I could advantageously go; and the third since my return to this place. I have read them all with interest and pleasure, but have not had time to reply till now.
I rejoice at your great victory deeply. it seemed to me to have been complete. I wish it could have been followed up by the destruction of the Federal army. As regards your proposition as to myself, I wish that I could feel that it was prompted by other reasons than kind feelings to myself. I think that your could do better than I could. It was with that view I urged your going. The President, being on the ground, I hope will do all that can be done. He has to take a broad view of the whole ground, and must order as he deems best. I will cheerfully do anything in my power.
In addition to other infirmities, I have been suffering so much from rheumatism in my back that I could scarcely get about. The first two days of our march I had to be hauled in a wagon, and subsequently every motion of my horse, and indeed of my body, gave much pain. I am rather better now, though I still suffer. We could not come up with Meade. We had to take circuitous and by-roads, while he had broad and passable routes on either side of the railroad. We struck his rear-guards three times,--the last at Bristoe, where Hill with his advance of two brigades fell too precipitately on one of his corps,--suffered a repulse and loss. He was finally driven beyond Bull Run. I saw he could easily get behind his intrenchments in front of Alexandria. Our men were dreadfully off for shoes, blankets, and clothes. One division alone had over a thousand barefooted men. We had failed to take any, and I fear had failed to manage as well as we might. The country was a perfect waste. A northeast storm broke upon us. There was neither shelter nor food for man or beast. I saw no real good I could accomplish by maneuvering. The enemy had destroyed the bridge over the Rappahannock and blown up one of the piers. The freshet after we left the Rapidan carried away the railroad bridge over that river. I therefore withdrew to the Rappahannock, destroying the railroad from Cub Run (this side of Manassas Junction) to the Rappahannock River.
Source: Official Records
Commentary
In late September and early October of 1863, James Longstreet wrote three letters to General Lee, detailing his activities in Georgia and Tennessee, his disappointments, and his hopes for the future. Longstreet also expressed some of his thoughts on an overall strategy which included bringing Lee out West to command the Army of Tennessee. Following is Lee’s response to those three letters.
Longstreet's critics should take special note of some of the wording and the subjects discussed. Two of the most damning charges made against him after the war were 1) that he resenting being commanded and desired his own army, away from Lee or any other superior in the field and 2) that Lee was consistently upset with Longstreet's service after Gettysburg and no longer trusted him. As to the first charge, Longstreet asked Lee directly to come West and take command, a request Lee denied mainly due to his desire to remain in or near Virginia. To the second charge, Lee makes more than one reference to his faith in Longstreet's abilities in addition to expressing his desire to have him back with the Army of Northern Virginia.