HEADQUARTERS,
Tyner's Station, November 5, 1863.
General B. BRAGG,
Commanding :
GENERAL: Your letter of to-day is received. I understood you to say a few days ago that the enemy's forces around Knoxville were 15,000. As I had frequently heard you say that you did not count cavalry in estimating forces, I took it to mean 15,000 infantry and artillery. I presume now that you included the entire command in your estimate. That figure will, I presume, come very near covering my own force also. Your letter seems to look to the operations of our cavalry force as likely to drive the enemy from East Tennessee. I do not regard that as at all probable, and shall only count upon the cavalry for such services as will be effective. That is, I do not think that cavalry operations can drive the enemy out of East Tennessee, and I do not, therefore, propose to rely upon it at all for such purposes.
In reviewing your instructions of yesterday it appears that you intend that in driving the enemy out of East Tennessee I must surely keep railroad communication with your forces at Chattanooga. That is, that the latter condition must be fulfilled under all circumstances. My understanding of the move was that I should gain possession of East Tennessee, and, if possible, the army there, as the primary condition, and in doing this as far as practicable keep the communication with Chattanooga open, but to get East Tennessee and to get rid of the enemy's forces there. Please advise me if this is the intention.
If I am to move along the line of the railroad repairing and building bridges, &c., it is not at all probable that I shall even overtake the enemy, particularly if my force exceeds his, as you say. If I am to attempt to overtake the enemy, with a view to destroy him, I must of necessity leave the line of railroad, and to leave it, I must of necessity break the railroad communication with Chattanooga. And if I follow the railroad after crossing the Little Tennessee River I must either break the communication or wait to rebuild the bridge, and thus, of course, must give the enemy abundance of time to escape or fortify. I hope that you will perceive my embarrassment and relieve it, either by ordering me to build and guard the railroad, or authorize me to use my discretion in the emergency. I think that you greatly overestimate the enemy's force at and around Chattanooga. I have seen the force every day for the time it has been here and cannot think it exceeds your force without Stevenson's division, and the greater part of it has been badly beaten in battle not long since; whereas the force that I am to undertake is somewhat fresher from battle. If my force were strong enough to enable me to operate rapidly, the danger to the army at this point would be reduced in proportion to the rapidity and effectiveness of my movements. If I am feeble my movements must be slow and cautious. This would give the enemy warning and time to strike at you. If I can move rapidly and with force, I can make myself felt so decidedly and so suddenly that, instead of his striking here, he will, as soon as he feels me, be obliged to begin to look out for his rear, and thus you will be enabled to move on his flank or re-enforce in East Tennessee, with a view to threaten his communications, so as to throw him far back from his present position. I hope that I may have been able to make my views understood. I am in the rain and mud, and find it a little difficult to write.
I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General
Source: Official Records
Commentary
Almost immediately after being ordered into East Tennessee, Longstreet's command began experiencing problems. Miscommunication between himself and Braxton Bragg, at least in part due to the feud that had devleoped between the two over the last month, necessitated a series of notes back and forth in which the two generals tried to work out the problems of the movement. Neither Bragg nor Longstreet would take responsibilty for the problems that developed, and it is difficult to know for certain if any one of them is totally to blame. It is notable, however, that the problems were genuine, and Bragg all but refused to believe the difficulties existed.
What follows is an example of one of those letters, this one sent by Longstreet.