Head-quarters, September 2, 1863.
General R.E. Lee,
Commanding:
General,--Your letter of the 31st is received. I have expressed to Generals Ewell and Hill your wishes, and am doing all that can be done to be well prepared with my own command. Our greatest difficulty will be in preparing our animals. I do not see that we can reasonably hope to accomplish much by offensive operations, unless you are strong enough to cross the Potomac. If we advance to meet the enemy on this side he will in all probability go into one of his many fortified positions. These we cannot afford to attack.
I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with two corps and send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we could accomplish more than by an advance from here.
The enemy seems to have settled down upon the plan of holding certain points by fortifying and defending, while he concentrates upon others. It seems to me that this must succeed, unless we can concentrate ourselves, and, at the same time, make occasional show of active operations at all points. I know of no other means of acting upon that principle at present, excepting to depend upon our fortifications in Virginia, and concentrate with one corps of this army, and such as may be drawn from others, in Tennessee, and destroy Rosecrans' army. I feel assured that this is practicable, and that greater advantage will be gained than by any operations from here.
I remain, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant- General.
Source: Official Records
Commentary
Longstreet was instantly mortified at the thought of the greatly weakened army once again assaulting Meade's defenses so soon after the catastrophy at Gettysburg. In response to Lee's letter of August 31, he sent the following reply: