"If we had an abundance of supplies it seems to me that we should go into Kentucky as a political move.
"If we retain our present positions the enemy will, in the course of a few months, be able to raise large additional forces, and when entirely ready he will again concentrate his forces upon some point, and will eventually get possession, and he will continue to proceed in the same way to the close of the chapter. If we go into Kentucky, and can there unite with General Johnston's army, we shall have force enough to hold it. The enemy will be more or less demoralized and disheartened by the great loss of territory which he will sustain, and he will find great difficulty in getting men enough to operate with before the elections in the fall, when in all probability Lincoln will be defeated and peace will follow in the spring.
"The political opponents of Mr. Lincoln can furnish no reason at this late day against the war so long as it is successful with him, and this far it has certainly been as successful as anyone could reasonable expect. If, however, his opponents were to find at the end of three years that we held Kentucky and were as well to do as at the beginning of the war, it would be a powerful argument against Lincoln and against the war. Lincoln's re-election seems to depend upon the result of our efforts during the present year. If he is re-elected, the war must continue, and I see no way of defeating his re-election except by military success."
Source: From Manassas to Appomattox
Commentary
One of Longstreet's greatest problems both during and after the war was in effectively communicating his views to others so that they were given the most favorable reception. The problem wasn't, as some critics claim, arrogance, the belief that his views were always the best ones and thus required no explanation, rather Longstreet's apparent lack of understanding of the political complexities of both the army and the post-war Southern society. It is also possible he rightly held these niceties in contempt and felt that political and social posturing were irrelevant. As it relates to his plans for the war, Longstreet believed that the government and the army should stop its petty bickering and look toward the goal of Southern independence. Unfortunately, those in power often turned deaf to his opinions because of his unwillingness to play the political game.
Longstreet's plans for the war in 1864 show the depth of his strategic vision and place him firmly in what modern historians refer to as the Western concentration group. Longstreet understood better than many politicians and most of his contemporary commanders what role politics and territory played in the willingness of the people of the North to continue the war. He was not merely a brilliant field commander; he was wise to the larger picture and realized that more than just force of arms would be necessary for the South the succeed. The year 1864, as has been proven by history, was a pivotal year and perhaps the last chance -- before the re-election of Lincoln -- the Confederacy had at winning her independence. Longstreet knew then, with exactitude, what he know now with the benefit of hindsight.
However, as mentioned, he presented his plans without the grace required in presenting an argument, and his plans were denied. Only once, in a letter to Thomas Jordan, General Beauregard's Chief of Staff, did Longstreet fully explain his vision and the reasoning behind it. Had he been this explicit when dealing with Richmond officials, it is possible he would have received a better consideration.
A portion of Longstreet's letter to Jordan which details Longstreet's reasons behind his plans, as reprinted in William Garrett Piston's Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, follows: