". . .some half-hour or more before the cannonade began, I was startled by the receipt of a note from Longstreet as follows: --
"Colonel: If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal upon your judgment to determine the matter and shall expect you to let Gen. Pickett know when the moment offers."
"Until that moment, though I fully recognized the strength of the enemy's position, I had not doubted that we would carry it, in my confidence that Lee was ordering it. But here was a proposition that I should decide the question. Overwhelming reasons against the assault at once seemed to stare me in the face. Gen. Wright of Anderson's division was standing with me. I showed him the letter and expressed my views. He advised me to write them to Longstreet, which I did as follows: --
"General: I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the enemy by his return fire, as his infantry is little exposed to view and the smoke will obscure the field. If, as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one, and if result is unfavorable we will have none left for another effort. And even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very bloody cost."
Alexander then describes his position and his thoughts on the results if Pickett should be repulsed. Then, he adds,
"I asked Wright: 'What do you think of it? Is it hard to get there as it looks?' He answered: 'The trouble is not in going there. I went there with my brigade yesterday. There is a place where you can get breath and re-form. The trouble is to stay there after you get there, for the whole Yankee army is there in a bunch.'
"I failed to fully appreciate all that this might mean. The question seemed merely one of support, which was peculiarly the province of General Lee. I had seen several of Hill's brigades forming to support Pickett, and had heard a rumor that Lee had spoken of a united attack by the whole army. I determined to see Pickett and get an idea of his feelings. I did so, and finding him both cheerful and sanguine, I felt that if the artillery fire opened, Pickett must make the charge but that Longstreet should know my views, so I wrote him as follows: --
"General: When our fire is at its best, I will advise Gen. Pickett to advance."
"It must have been with bitter disappointment that Longstreet saw the failure of his hope to avert a useless slaughter, for he was fully convinced of its hopelessness. Yet even he could have scarcely realized, until the event showed, how entirely unprepared were Hill and Ewell to render aid to his assault and to take prompt advantage of even temporary success. None of their guns had been posted with a view to cooperative fire, nor to follow the charge, and much of their ammunition had been prematurely wasted. And although Pickett's assault, when made, actually carried the enemy's guns, nowhere was there the slightest preparation to come to his assistance. The burden of the whole task fell upon the 10 brigades employed. The other 27 brigades and 56 fresh guns were but widely scattered spectators."
Alexander then describes the opening of the cannonade and how, as far as he could tell, it was accomplishing no positive effect. However, having determined that if the assault was not to be ordered he was not the one to decide the matter, thus he must let Pickett know when the most opportune time was presented. Under that consideration, he sent the following note to Pickett: --
"General: If you are to advance at all, you must come at once or we will not be able to support you as we ought. But the enemy's fire has not slackened materially and there are still 18 guns firing from the cemetery."
The last of this note is indicative of the confusion on the battlefield. Alexander had been misinformed that the position being attacked and from which the Federals were replying with their own artillery was the cemetery. Alexander then continues,
"I had hardly sent this note when there was a decided falling off in the enemy's fire, and as I watched I saw other guns limbered up and withdrawn. We frequently withdrew from fighting Federal guns in order to save our ammunition for their infantry. The enemy had never heretofore practiced such economy. After waiting a few minutes and seeing that no fresh guns replaced those withdrawn, I felt sure that the enemy was feeling the punishment, and at 1:40 I sent a note to Pickett as follows: --
"For God's sake come quick. The 18 guns have gone. Come quick or my ammunition will not let me support you properly."
Not seeing Pickett emerge for some minutes, Alexander became increasingly worried of his own ability to support the assault. He describes what was happening: --
"I afterward learned what had followed the sending of my first note. It reached Pickett in Longstreet's presence. He read it and handed it to Longstreet. Longstreet read and stood silent. Pickett said, 'General, shall I advance?' Longstreet knew that it must be done, but was unwilling to speak the words. He turned in his saddle and looked away. Pickett saluted and said, 'I am going to move forward, sir,' and galloped off."
Alexander then describes the final moments before Pickett emerges from the cover of Seminary Ridge: --
"Longstreet, leaving his staff, rode out alone and joined me on the left flank of the guns. It was doubtless 1:50 or later, but I did not look at my watch again. I had grown very impatient to see Pickett, fearing ammunition would run short, when Longstreet joined me. I explained the situation. He spoke sharply, -- 'Go and stop Pickett where he is and replenish your ammunition.' I answered : 'We can't do that, sir. The train has but little. It would take an hour to distribute it, and meanwhile the enemy would improve the time.'
"Longstreet seemed to stand irresolute (we were both dismounted) and then spoke slowly and with great emotion: 'I do not want to make this charge. I do not see how it can succeed. I would not make it now but that General Lee has ordered it and is expecting it.'
"I felt that he was inviting a word of acquiescence on my part and that if given he would again order [to stop Pickett]. But I was too conscious of my own youth and inexperience to express any opinion not directly asked. So I remained silent while Longstreet fought his battle out alone and obeyed his orders."
Source: Military Memoirs of a Confederate
With that final line, Alexander sums up the charge and Longstreet's part in it. Many of Longstreet's critics throughout the years have accused him of disobeying orders given him by General Lee. This is disingenuous. If at any moment in Longstreet's career he wanted to disobey orders, it was at this moment. But, he didn't. He obeyed General Lee to the letter, despite the fact he knew that thousands were about to die in a useless effort.
Commentary
Some historians have commented very briefly on the exchange of notes and words between Alexander and Longstreet prior to and during what came to be known as Pickett's Charge. Some have used it as a criticism of Longstreet while others have merely noted that it happened. In another page of this web site I briefly describe these notes, providing my own thoughts on the matter.
For the most complete account of the incident, one must turn to E.P. Alexander's memoirs. From his description, the reader will doubtless come to the conclusion that the exchange affected him very deeply. Whether this was felt at the time or later, after the results of the battle were known, is not certain. However, one can imagine being in Alexander's place, a subordinate artillery officer, a mere colonel, almost charged with the duty of countermanding a direct order from Robert E. Lee.
Alexander goes into great detail to discuss this matter in his memoirs. A part of that is reproduced here.