New Orleans, La.
July 25th, 1873
Gen. L. McLaws
Except Central R.R. Ga.
Dear General:
Your valued favor of the 16th inst. With its inclosure [sic] arrived. I thank you for the copy of a letter previously written to another party on the Battle of Gettysburg and shall be pleased to view such others later as you can supply on this subject. It is not my purpose to reply to the scurrilous remarks made by Gen. Pendleton, but I think that I may be justified under the circumstances in publishing an account of the Gettysburg Campaign, and the causes leading to and connected with it.
You will probably remember that Grant passed the batteries at Vicksburg at the same time that Hooker crossed the Rapidan and gave battle at Chancellorsville. At that time I was at Suffolk with Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions. As soon as Hooker crossed the Rapidan, I was ordered up from Suffolk to rejoin Gen. Lee, but did not join him of course until after the battle was fought. His success then gave us new opportunity to consider what means, if any there were, of operating so as to save Vicksburg and the army then under siege at that place. We soon found that we could not get sufficient army at Jackson, Miss., to warrant new hope that we could attack Grant with any reasonable expectation of forcing him to abandon his siege. My proposition then was, that Gen. Lee should send the two divisions, just returned from Suffolk, to reinforce the army in Tennessee, and that Johnston should move simultaneously with the army that he was collecting at Jackson; for the purpose of operating against Grant—to the same place, and that his Army in Tennessee, thus strongly reinforced, should fall suddenly upon the Federal army in Tennessee, crush it or capture the greater portion of it and then march rapidly to the Ohio, and take Cincinnati. This struck me as the only chance for saving our Army at Vicksburg, because it was assumed that the success contemplated would force Grant to abandon the siege, and bring his army north to protect his own people and thin frontiers.
General Lee objected and I am forced to believe that the only cause of his objection was his unwillingness to part with any part of his command. For he adopted, in place of this proposition, his campaign into Penn. And with the expressed hope that he might be successful in Penn. And in that way draw off the Federal Army at Vicksburg. If you will read his report you will see that he says as much there. My only objection to this was the delay that extensive preparations for a campaign in the enemy’s country would entail, and possible defeat one in regard to the army at Vicksburg. I went no further of course than to state my objection and express my preference.
Finding that he was resolved upon his campaign into Penn. I set to work to do what I could to meet his wishes, and to facilitate operations generally.
I proposed then, as the ruling idea of our campaign, Napoleon’s advice to Marmot at the head of an invading army. "To make the enemy fight him in his own position." (I don’t know that I give Napoleon’s own words, but I believe that I give in substance, his meaning.) We agreed that this was a good maxim, and particularly applicable to the Confederate army, as our experience, in the 1st Corps, at Fredericksburg, when we lost but about one fourth of the loss of the enemy sufficiently shown the advantage of receiving instead of giving the attack. Another, more foreiber[?], view was, that our losses were so heavy when we attacked that our Army must soon be depleted to such extent that we should not be able to hold a force in the field sufficient to meet our adversary. I even went so far as to say, on several occasions, to Gen. Lee, that I would agree to receive the attack of the Army of the Potomac with the 1st Corps, if he would only allow me to handle it so as to force the attack, from the enemy, and that I would repulse every attack without aid from the balance of his Army. So that when the Federals were broken, he should have his 2d and 3d Corps fresh and ready to pursue and destroy their shattered ranks. This and many other points I might mention in this connection, but I should take up too much of your time. Besides, they will readily suggest themselves to your mind.
The ruling ideas of our campaign may be briefly stated thus. Under no circumstances were we to give battle, but exhaust our skill to [xx] in trying to force the enemy to do so in a position of our own choosing. The 1st Corps to receive the attack and fight the battle. The other Corps, to then fall upon and try to destroy the Army of the Potomac.
I should probably say that we had often discussed our previous battles, and fruitless victories, such as 1st and 2nd Manassas, Fredericksburg, Chickahominy, and had concluded even victories such as these were consuming us, and would eventually destroy us, so that a fruitless victory for us was about equivalent of a defeat to the Federals, and only left the result to time. As I have intimated our condition was discussed in all of its bearing and almost every day from the 10th of May ‘63—until the Battle and the [?] policy as above indicated was firmly fixed in our minds. I went so far as to say to Gen. Lee on one occasion, that "all men were liable to become more or less excited when Battle is imminent, and in case this should happen to either of us we would refer back to our mature [?] ideas in our calmer moments." I suppose that you have known much of this before, but probably not so definitely our train of thought and mutual understanding.
You will now understand my surprise at finding all of our previously arranged plans so unexpectedly changed, and why I might wish and hope, to get the Gen. To consider of our former arrangements. As for his ordering me to attack at daylight, it is a thing he probably never dreamed of, nor did he ever on any occasion order me to attack, naming the hour, or designating the mode of attack. I believe he invariably left these things to Jackson and myself, and if he ever ordered me to attack at all on the 2d, I do not remember it. I know however that it was his wish that I should do so, and finding a salient point, at the Peach Orchard I did attack with yours and Hood’s divisions—Pickett having been left at Chambersburg to guard his supplies during the absence of Stuart. This attack went further than I intended that it should, and resulted in the loss of your gallant Brigadier Barksdale. It was my intention not to pursue this attack, if [it] was likely to prove the enemy’s position too strong for my two division. I suppose that Barksdale was probably under impression the entire Corps was up. The position proving so strong on the 2d, I was less inclined to attack on the 3d, in fact I had no idea of attacking until Gen. Lee came to me just before Pickett’s division arrived. On the night of the 2d, I supposed that on the morrow Gen. Lee would return to the policy that we had previously decided upon, and under this impression, I set out before daylight on the 3d, to examine the ground on my right, and to get possession of the open road between Meade and Washington. I found the other road open and a small force on it when Gen. Lee joined me early on the morning of the 3d, and said as much to him, and went on to suggest that he move Ewell’s corps around my rear and right so as to command this other road, and that we then place our Army in a strong position for the day and await the enemy’s attack. Finding during the day some five or six miles to our rear, and in the direction of Washington to find a better and stronger position for us moving in the direction of Washington to find a better and stronger position for us to take up at night. I held that the enemy finding us moving in the direction of Washington and between us and his Capital, would be obliged to attack us, and in some haste, which would give us just the kind of battle that we had agreed to seek and to fight. With some impatience he reject my proposition, and [ordered] the attack and designated the point.
Some six or seven months after the battle (when we were in Tennessee) Gen. Meade’s account of it was published, and Gen. Lee sent me word by Capt. Goree, one of my aides, that after reading Meade’s account of the battle, he was satisfied that my counsel was right and that he would probably have had a great success had he adopted my suggestions. He has repeatedly made the same remark, and you are aware, I presume, that he said upon the field immediately after repulse "It is all my fault."
Your remarks about Pendleton’s assertions are as conclusive proof of his falsity as anything that may be addressed. It is a notorious fact that the enemy did not take up his position at the Cemetery until the night of the 1st of July. It is therefore impossible that Gen. Lee could have committed so gross an error as to have ordered an attack by the 1st Corps at daylight on the 2d.
I fear that you will begin to think this letter worse than the Battle itself. So I shall try and cut it off as short as possible.
In my former letters I apprehend that I did not express myself clearly. I did not expect your confidence in this matter, or rather I did not intend to ask for it. I merely meant to convey the idea that nothing that you might write would be printed or shown to anyone without your consent....
Very respectfully,
Your obt. svt.,
James Longstreet
Source: From Manassas to Appomattox
Commentary
In the following letter, Longstreet explains to McLaws several aspects of the Gettysburg campaign.