"Later in the afternoon [of July 1st] Lee rode forward to arrange a renewal of the attack upon Cemetery Hill from the town at daylight next morning. He held a long conference with Ewell, Early, and Rodes, who urged, instead, that Longstreet should attack the enemy's left flank. No one of those present had more than a very vague idea of the character and features of the enemy's line, and it is therefore not surprising that this advice, though very plausible in view of the success of the former flank movements, was here the worst possible."
Alexander, in his memoirs, then goes on to offer what he believed to be the best chance to break the Union line the next day, namely an attack upon the salient formed near the base and at the southern edge of Cemetery Hill. Referring to this, Alexander continues,
"It would be too much to say that an attack here on the morning of July 2 would have succeeded. But it is not at all too much to say that no other attack was possible at that time which would have had near as good chance of success, yet it was deliberately discarded, and Lee's conference closed with the understanding among all those present that Longstreet should attack in the morning upon the enemy's left. It was this which gave rise to the mistaken charges made after Lee's death that Longstreet had disobeyed orders in not attacking early on the 2d.
"No orders whatever were given Longstreet that night."
Source: Military Memoirs of a Confederate
Commentary
When, in 1872, Jubal Early initiated the assault on Longstreet's reputation, accusing him of disobeying Lee's orders at Gettysburg, he did so by advancing what has come to be known to history as the "Sunrise Attack" scenario. According to Early, Longstreet had been ordered by Lee to attack at dawn on July 2nd.
Besides the fact that the logic of Early's criticism is not valid, a point which is covered more fully in other portions of this web page, Longstreet was never so ordered. Historians who have researched the matter have almost unanimously come to this conclusion, but opinion varies wildly as to how or why Early came to believe this. Some will argue that Early made it up entirely, while others claim that he, along with William Pendleton, earnestly believed their charges to be true. I tend to believe it is a combination of the two points. It is likely that at some point, Early was under the impression that Longstreet was to attack at dawn on July 2nd, but despite evidence to the contrary, he used this in his crusade to discredit Longstreet after the war.
E. P. Alexander offers his own opinion, giving evidence to suggest how Early may have come to believe this. It should be noted that the original plan of Lee was to have Ewell's corps to open the assault on July 2nd, a plan which makes the most sense under the circumstances. For one thing, Ewell was already in position, with the enemy in his direct front. For another, the Federal left was completely unknown to anyone in the Confederate army, how strong it was, how far it extended, etc. To order such a blind attack on the Federal left without even knowing the point most favorable for an attack would have been beyond even Lee's audacity. Alexander relates: