Long and close study of the field from the Potomac to the James River, and the experiences of former campaigns, made it clear that the Army of the Potomac had been drawn into a false position, and it became manifest that there were but two moves left open for its spring campaign,--first, by crossing the upper fords of the Rappahannock; secondly, by detaching forces to the south side of the James, and by that route moving against Richmond.
To guard against the former I laid out lines for fieldworks and rifle-pits covering all approaches by the upper fords as far as the road leading from United States Ford. From that point the line broke to the rear, crossing the Plank road and extending back half a mile to command the road from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court-House. When the lines for these works were well marked, I was ordered, with the divisions of Hood and Pickett and Dearing’s and Henry’s artillery battalions, to the south side near Petersburg, to be in position to meet the latter move, leaving the divisions of McLaws and R.H. Anderson to finish the work on the lines of defence.
Source: From Manassas to Appomattox
What Longstreet fails to say directly with this report, and what most historians seem loathe to acknowledge, is that he constructed a system of defense that allowed his extended line behind Fredericksburg to be held effectively by fully half of the number of troops that had been required before, which allowed him to attend to important duty elsewhere. It is not known if the position could have withstood a full-scale assault, but many tactical experts in examining how Longstreet laid out his lines have commented that his works were nearly as strong as they had been when the Federals had attempted to take Fredericksburg in December of 1862.
Perhaps, though, from the perspective of the view of the war in terms of famous personalities, the greatest compliment and measure of the worth of Longstreet’s works came from Jackson who, upon seeing Longstreet’s fortifications, returned to his own lines and set his own corps about constructing similar fortifications.
In the final summation of the various commanders of the Civil War, there is no doubt that Longstreet’s service was not the most glorious. His labors were methodical and calculating, and he attempted, as much as possible, to leave little to chance. Despite the lack of glory, it can be argued that Longstreet’s efforts were some of the most important to the success of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Commentary
Had the controversial events that surrounded his life after the war never occurred, Longstreet would likely have gone down in the pages of history as one of the Civil War’s greatest field commanders. Still, his fame or reputation would likely not have exceeded that of “Stonewall” Jackson for reasons beyond the fact that Jackson became a martyr to the Southern cause with his death at Chancellorsville.
If one may be allowed to take a fanciful view of the Army of Northern Virginia as a modern American football team, the construction of that team from 2nd Manassas to Chancellorsville can be described the following way. General Lee served as the coach, the guiding force and inspiration to his team. Jackson was the quarterback or offensive captain, and Longstreet led the defensive unit. Like most analogies, this one will break down under close scrutiny, but for most purposes in discussing how the ANV attempted to operate, it works.
Like the modern football teams, the coach and the offense get all the glory. When a team wins a game, the quarterback is pronounced the victor and his coach the genius behind the win. There are reasons for this, the main one being that the most apparent sign that a team has won the game is by the score at the end of it. Likewise, in a battle, without a good offensive thrust, no true victory can be had. However, without a properly conducted defensive, all the two sides are really doing is trading touchdowns. The quarterback and his offensive unit can score all they want, but unless the defense stops the opposing team’s offense, a minor failure on the part of the offense will result in the team’s loss.
So it was with Longstreet, the defensive captain always with an eye to a better way at defending his men and his position so that when the offense could take the field, it could do a better job. Perhaps one of Longstreet’s greatest, and least reported, accomplishments in this area is in his work at Fredericksburg after the battle. In his memoirs, Longstreet doesn’t really report the importance of the measures he took, giving only this diminutive report of the basics of what he did