When we found that his [Burnside’s] army was in motion, General Jackson insisted that the crossing would be made below, and proposed to march his corps down to meet it. He was told [by Longstreet] that the neck of land between the Potomac and the Rappahannock was so interlaced with wet-weather streams and ravines that the route leading below was not practicable at that season; that the quicksands on the flats of the west side were formidable obstacles to the march of an army; that the only possible route for crossing the river was by the fords of the highlands, and that he must hold his troops ready to move accordingly. He was not satisfied with the refusal to accept his constriction of the enemy’s purpose, and demurred against authority less than General Lee’s, but found that the order must be obeyed. . .
. . .The bottomless roads and severe weather broke up the campaign, and the move back to camp [of the Federals] was reported to me before the Confederates marched from their camps.
Source: From Manassas to Appomattox
Longstreet’s refusal to allow Jackson to act as he wanted was the correct decision, but coming on the heals of Jackson’s disagreement with Lee about holding a defensive line on the Rappahannock (Jackson preferred the North Anna a few miles farther south), he was bound to be left feeling some bitterness at his second recent, yet mild rebuke from not just one but two superior officers. This may be the basis some historians and Longstreet critics have for claiming that the two men did not get along, but as D.H. Hill reports in letters to his wife, by the time Longstreet was dispatched to Suffolk, all animosities seemed to be forgotten and the amiable family that was the ANV seemed to be well.
Commentary
The relationship between James Longstreet and Thomas J. Stonewall” Jackson is not a subject often explored by historians. The reasons for this are difficult to define. Certainly a portion of the reason is due to Longstreet’s attacked reputation after the war and the desire of period historians to elevate the stature of Jackson while diminishing that of Longstreet. Additionally, not a great deal of primary source material exists which gives evidence to this relationship. Still the fact that Longstreet and Jackson were the two ranking subordinates in the Army of Northern Virginia makes certain that a relationship between the two men did exist, although to what degree is uncertain.
The most apparent relationship that can be explored in some detail involves their respective ranks. Longstreet outranked Jackson as per General Lee’s recommendations following the Maryland campaign of 1862. Some critics of Longstreet’s service maintain that this fact is merely an aberration and that Lee actually held Jackson in higher regard than Longstreet. (The notion that he preferred either over the other is nearly impossible to prove with primary evidence.) These critics further claim that Jackson’s generalship and tactical abilities exceeded those of Longstreet, and for this reasons the former should be considered the primary leader and motivating force in the ANV.
After Fredericksburg, while Lee was in Richmond, Longstreet was left in command, and the following incident occurred which serves to aid in disproving these critics’ assertions. General Burnside had just embarked on what would come to be known as the Mud March,” and in preparation Longstreet prepared the army for battle, to move to the highland fords in case Burnside was actually able to make a crossing. Jackson disagreed as Longstreet’s testimony on the matter indicates: